The paper addresses the cheating prevention in secret sharing. We consider secret sharing with binary shares. The secret also is binary. This model allows us to use results and constructions from the well developed theory of cryptographically strong boolean functions. In particular, we prove that for given secret sharing, the average cheating probability over all cheating vectors and all original vectors, i.e., In this case the secret sharing is said to be cheating immune. We further establish a relationship between cheating-immune secret sharing and cryptographic criteria of boolean functions. This enables us to construct cheating-immune secret sharing.
Introduction
Since its invention in 1978 by Blakley (Bla79) and Shamir (Sha79) , secret sharing has evolved dramatically. Initially, it was designed to facilitate a distributed storage for a secret in an unreliable or insecure environment. Later, however, secret sharing has been incorporated into public key cryptography giving rise to the well-known concept of group or society oriented cryptography (see (Des88) ). Now secret sharing is one of the basic cryptographic tools with variety of very interesting schemes based on algebraic or geometric structures.
Tompa and Woll (TW88) observed that Shamir secret sharing can be subject to cheating by dishonest participants who, at the recovery stage, may submit invalid shares to the combiner. Clearly, the combiner reconstructs an invalid secret and passes it to currently active participants. The honest participants are left with the invalid secret while the cheaters are able to recover the valid secret from the invalid one. This observation is true for all linear secret sharing. The cheating attack can also be extended for geometrical secret sharing.
Cheating prevention can be considered in the context of conditionally and unconditionally secure secret sharing. We focus our attention on unconditionally secure secret sharing. In this setting, cheating can be thwarted by
Background
Secret sharing allows a group of participants P = {P 1 , . . . , P n } to collectively hold a secret K ∈ K , where K is a set of elements from which the secret is drawn. Secret sharing is created by a trusted algorithm called a dealer who for a given secret, generates a collection of shares s i ∈ S, where S is a set of shares.
Note that s i is given to P i , i = 1, . . . , n. The collective ownership of the secret is defined by the access structure of secret sharing. The access structure Γ is a collection of subgroups of P that are authorised to recover the secret.
An authorised group of participants A ∈ Γ is able to reconstruct the secret by invoking a trusted algorithm called combiner. The combiner always returns the valid secret if the group A submits their valid shares. If the group, however, is too small, i.e. A / ∈ Γ, then the algorithm returns a value which is not the valid secret (with an overwhelming probability).
In this work, we describe a secret sharing by a set of distribution rules (Sti95) , where a distribution rule is a function f : P → S that represents possible distribution of shares to the participants. In other words, secret sharing is a set
where F K is a distribution rule corresponding to the secret K. Equivalently, F can be presented in the form of distribution table T . The table has (n + 1) columns -the first one includes secrets and the other n ones list shares assigned to participants (P 1 , . . . , P n ), respectively. Each row of the distribution table specifies the secret for a collection of shares held by P . Note that F K can be seen as a part of the distribution table with rows whose first entry is K. This table is denoted by T K .
Most of practical secret sharing schemes are linear and therefore subject to an attack observed by Tompa and Woll (TW88) . The attack permits a dishonest participant who at the pooling stage submits an invalid share, to recover the valid secret from an invalid one returned by the combiner.
Binary Sequences
We consider a mapping f from V n to GF(2) where V n is the vector space of n tuples of elements from GF(2). f is also called a function on V n . The truth table of a mapping f is a sequence defined by ( f (α 0 ), f (α 1 ), . . . , f (α 2 n −1 )), where α 0 = (0, . . . , 0, 0), α 1 = (0, . . . , 0, 1), . . ., α 2 n −1 = (1, . . . , 1, 1). Each α j is said to be the binary representation of integer j, j = 0, 1, . . . , 2 n − 1. A function f is said to be balanced if its truth table contains an equal number of zeros and ones.
An affine function f on V n is a function that takes the form of f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = a 1 x 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ a n x n ⊕ c, where ⊕ denotes the addition in GF(2), a j , c ∈ GF(2), j = 1, 2, . . . , n. The function f is called a linear function if c = 0. It is easy to verify that any nonzero affine function is balanced. Let , denote the scalar product of two vectors. There precisely exist 2 n linear functions on V n . We can denote all the 2 n linear functions by ϕ 0 , ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ 2 n −1 , where
The Hamming weight of a vector α ∈ V n , denoted by HW (α), is the number of nonzero coordinates of α. The Hamming weight of a function f , denoted by HW ( f ), is the number of nonzero terms in the truth table of f .
The nonlinearity of a function f on V n , denoted by N f , is the minimal Hamming distance between f and all affine functions on V n , i.e.,
where ψ 1 , ψ 2 , . . ., ψ 2 n+1 are all the affine functions on V n . High nonlinearity can be used to resist a linear attack. We know that N f ≤ 2 n−1 − 2 1 2 n−1 (MS78). Let f be a function on V n . We say that f satisfies the propagation criterion with respect to α if f (x) ⊕ f (x ⊕ α) is a balanced function, where x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ V n and α = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ V n . Furthermore f is said to satisfy the propagation criterion of degree k if it satisfies the propagation criterion with respect to every nonzero vector α whose Hamming weight is not larger than k. (PLL + 91). The propagation properties were employed in selecting the S-boxes used in the cipher, which contributed to the strength of the cipher against various attacks including differential (BS91) and linear (Mat94) attacks. Note that the strict avalanche criterion (SAC) (WT86) is the same as the propagation criterion of degree one.
The concept of correlation immune functions was introduced by Siegenthaler (Sie84). Xiao and Massey gave an equivalent definition (CCCS91; XM88). A function f on V n is called a k-th order correlation immune function if ∑ x∈V n f (x)(−1) β,x = 0 for all β ∈ V n with 1 ≤ HW (β) ≤ k, where f (x) and β, x are regarded as real-valued functions. Correlation immune functions are used in the design of runningkey generators in stream ciphers to resist a correlation attack. A balanced kth-order correlation immune function is also called a k-resilient function. Due to Lemma 3 of (ZZ97), we can give a k-resilient function an equivalent definition: a function f is said to be k-resilient if f satisfies the property: for every subset
A special class of functions is called bent. There exist equivalent definitions of bent functions (Rot76). For example, a function f on V n is said to be bent if and only if f satisfies the propagation criterion with respect to every nonzero vector in V n . The sum of any bent function on V n and any affine function on V n is bent. Bent functions are not balanced and bent functions on V n exist only when n is even. Furthermore, it is well known that any bent function f on V n achieves the maximum nonlinearity, i.e., N f = 2 n−1 − 2 1 2 n−1 .
Model of Cheating
Given (n, n) threshold secret sharing defined by its distribution table T . We define a function f : V n → {0, 1} and fix an integer c; 1 ≤ c ≤ n, which points to the position (column) of the cheater P c in T . The vector δ c = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ V n represents the cheating vector introduced by the cheater. Note that the cheater P c can only change his share on the c-th position (other positions are not changed assuming that other participants are honest). Let ρ c,α be the probability of successful cheating by P c , where α is a row of T indicating the secret and shares currently in use. A precise expression of ρ c,α will be given in next two paragraphs. In the work (PZ01), it was shown that for an arbitrary α, there is a vector α ∈ V n such that either ρ c,α + ρ c,α = 1 or ρ c,α = 1. This implies that the maximum cheating probability is always larger than or equal to 1 2 . Naturally one would expect that (a) max{ρ c,α |α ∈ V n , 1 ≤ c ≤ n} is as small as possible, and (b) ρ = 1 n ·2 −n ∑ n c=1 ∑ α∈V n ρ c,α is as small as possible (ideally, the both probabilities are equal to 1 2 ). In this paper we identify conditions for which (a) and (b) hold and as the result we introduce the concept of cheating-immune secret sharing. Furthermore we characterise cheating-immune secret sharing using cryptographic properties of boolean functions. Thus we are able to construct cheating-immune secret sharing that gives no advantage to a cheater over honest participants.
We introduce the following notations:
• α = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) is the sequence of shares held by P and the secret K = f (α),
is the sequence of shares submitted to the combiner where P c modified her share. The sequence δ c = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) contains all zero except the c-th position and represents modification done by the cheater, K * = f (α * ) is the invalid secret returned by combiner,
taken from rows of T containing α and K which are consistent with the invalid secret returned by the combiner. The set determines the view of the cheater after getting back K * from the combiner,
. . , x n ) = K} is the set of rows which contain the current share of P c and the valid secret K.
The function f is called defining function. To prevent cheaters from finding the correct secret (and effectively discourage them from cheating), one would wish to obtain Ω * α as big as possible for any α, while Ω * α ∩ Ω α as small as possible. The nonzero vector δ c = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0), where only the c-th coordinate is nonzero, is called the cheating vector. α = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) is called the original vector. The value of ρ c,α = #(Ω * α ∩ Ω α )/#Ω * α , where #X denotes the the number of elements in the set X, expresses the probability of cheater success with respect to α = (s 1 , . . . , s n ). As the original vector α = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) is always in Ω * α ∩ Ω α , the probability of successful cheating is always nonzero or ρ c,α > 0. The following result can be found in (PZ01): Theorem 1 implies that the maximum probability of successful cheating is always higher than or equal to 1 2 .
Given secret sharing with its distribution table T and the defining function f on V n . The value of
is the average cheating probability over all original vectors in V n for a fixed cheating vector. The value of
is the average cheating probability over all cheating vectors (with Hamming weight one) and all original vectors in V n . It should be noticed that the definition of ρ depends on a particular defining function f . 
and #R i = r i , i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Obviously r 1 + r 2 + r 3 + r 4 = 2 n−1 . Let β 1 ∈ V c−1 , β 2 ∈ V n−c and α = (β 1 , 0, β 2 ) or α = (β 1 , 1, β 2 ). Due to the definition of ρ c,α , it is easy to verify that
There exist two cases to be considered: R j ∪ R i = / 0, where / 0 denotes the empty set, for each ( j, i) ∈ {(1, 2), (3, 4), (1, 3), (2, 4)}, and R j 0 ∪ R i 0 = / 0 for some ( j 0 , i 0 ) ∈ {(1, 2), (3, 4), (1, 3), (2, 4)}.
Case 1: R j ∪ R i = / 0 for each ( j, i) ∈ {(1, 2), (3, 4), (1, 3), (2, 4)}. In this case r j + r i = 0 for each ( j, i) ∈ {(1, 2), (3, 4), (1, 3), (2, 4)}. Therefore we can compute ρ c : Thus r 3 = 0. Since r 1 = r 2 = r 3 = 0, we know that r 4 = 2 n−1 . We compute ρ c : 5 Cheating-Immune Secret Sharing Scheme
Secret sharing resists cheating if either max{ρ c,α |α ∈ V n , 1 ≤ c ≤ n} is as small as possible, or ρ is as small as possible. As mentioned in Section 4, the maximum cheating probability is always larger than or equal to 1 2 . Due to Theorem 1, if ρ = 1 2 then the maximum cheating probability is equal to 1 2 . We now prove the converse. Assume that the maximum cheating probability is equal to Since resilient functions are balanced, the defining function of any cheating immune secret sharing must be balanced.
Construction of Cheating-Immune Secret Sharing Scheme
Based on Theorem 4, to construct an cheating-immune secret sharing scheme, we need a 1-resilient function on V n satisfying the SAC.
The following result can be found from the proof of Theorem 17 of the reference (SM00), that is an article on boolean functions with cryptographic properties.
Lemma 1 Let h be a bent function on V n−2 (n is even). Set
where HW (a 1 , . . . , a n−2 ) = If we apply the function mentioned in Lemma 1 to Theorem 4, then we obtain an cheating-immune secret sharing with defining function whose nonlinearity is 2 n−1 − 2 1 2 n . Therefore we have the following conclusion: Example 1 Let n = 4 in Lemma 1. Set h(x 1 , x 2 ) = x 1 x 2 . It is easy to see that h is a bent function on V 2 . Choose (a 1 , a 2 ) = (1, 0). Then HW (a 1 , a 2 
We further set
Due to Lemma 1, f is 1-resilient and satisfies the propagation criterion of degree 1 (SAC). Due to Theorem 4, this secret sharing is cheating immune. Let the group P include four participants and the defining function
It is easy to find the truth table of f which is 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0
The secret sharing can be described as the following table: 
Conclusions
We have proved an interesting property of secret sharing. For given secret sharing, the average cheating probability over all cheating vectors and all original vectors, denoted by ρ, satisfies ρ ≥ 1 2 , and the equality holds if and only if the cheating probability ρ c,α satisfies ρ c,α = 1 2 for every cheating vector δ c and every original vector α. In this case the secret sharing is said to be cheating immune. We have found a relationship between cheating immune secret sharing and cryptographic criteria of boolean functions, and then we have successfully constructed cheating immune secret sharing using a highly nonlinear defining function. For simplicity, in this work we have considered cheating immune secret sharing where there is a single dishonest participant (or cheater). However this concept can be generalised for the case where there are many colluding cheaters. Future works include also the design of cheating immune secret sharing for a given access structure.
